2013, №4

ИНСТИТУТЫ-КАК-РАВНОВЕСИЯ VS ИНСТИТУТЫ-КАК-ПРАВИЛА

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Аннотация:

В настоящее время в новой институциональной экономической теории сосуществуют и конкурируют как минимум два понимания институтов: (1) как равновесий в некоторой игре (институты-как-равновесия, ИкР) и (2) как правил с механизмами принуждения их к исполнению (институты-как-правила, ИкП). Несколько особняком стоит подход Э. Остром и коллег, разработавших в рамках второго подхода «грамматику институтов» с довольно необычной терминологией [52]. Поскольку проблематика институционального анализа весьма актуальна для отечественной экономической науки, а названные понимания предполагают разную его методологию, мы считаем важным попытаться проанализировать и оценить сильные и слабые стороны данных подходов, с тем чтобы исследователи, выбирающие один из них, более четко представляли их ограничения. Кроме того, такой сравнительный анализ будет полезен, как представляется, и в рамках изучения институциональной экономики в высшей школе.

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Тамбовцев Виталий Леонидович, д. э. н., профессор, зав. лабораторией институционального анализа экономического ф-та МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова, г. Москва, e-mail: vitalytambovtsev@gmail.com

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